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Safe computing
How “diseases” are transmitted,
and safety measures network
partners can take

Thomas L. Casavant
Bruce M. McMillin

into our office-for warmth. This invasion was compounded by an enormous array of snacks an office mate
kept in his desk. The snacks made
the office particularly attractive for
the little creatures. The mice didn’t
really bother us since they would
scoot through the office late at night.
Each morning, our office mate, however, found more snacks gone and
little brown presents left by the mice
in his desk. He took it upon himself to safeguard his goodies. First
he attempted to plug all the holes in
the office by stuffing every nook and
cranny with aluminum foil. Anyone
who’s ever had mice in their house
realizes the fallacy in this move; the
mice just find new holes. When this
process proved ineffective, he began
to set mouse traps. This realized impressive results; we caught several
mice per day for weeks. The mouse
count even made it into the departmental system’s log-in message. After a while the number of catches fell
off-but not the mice droppings in
his desk.
The purpose of this article is not
to describe rodent problems nor is
it to preach on the evils of snack
food. Rather, we are interested in the
problems of unwanted benign or malicious “visitors” in a computing system connected to a computer internetwork. The popular press has been
inundated with versions of “virus attacks” and “worm attacks.” Unfortunately, the analogies of these attacks
drawn by the popular press, as well
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as by some computing professionals, to their biological counterparts
has unnecessarily increased the mystique surrounding these attacks. We
grudgingly acknowledge these labels
of worm, virus, and trojan horse for
the purposes of discussion and give
technical definitions for each in Figure 1.
The now infamous “Christmas
tree worm” of 1987 led off the most
recent wave. A user composed a
program that, when executed, displayed a view of a Christmas tree
and a greeting. This program was sent
to several users on the BITNET
computer network, who also ran this
program. As a side effect, however,
the program looked at all the electronic mail distribution lists of the
user and forwarded the message to
each address, much as the geometric progression of a chain letter.
The internetwork was swamped with
greeting messages and, thus, effec-
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tively shut down attached networks
for several days. A more recent attack occurred on the DARPA Internet* in November 1988. This, too,
was a worm attack that exploited
a well-known “hole” in the electronic mail facility of computers running the UNIX operating system.
The worm was able to gain access to
many UNIX systems and run many
programs thus slowing down the systems for all its normal users.
Why is it so easy to create these
worms? How did they come to such
prominence? Are they bad? If so,
how can we provide safe computing in the sense that unauthorized or
*Technically the DARPA Internet interconnects major government labs such as NSF, DOE, and NASA
and most research institutions. The popular name
ARPANET comes from the network created by
the Advanced Research Project Agency (ARPA)
in the 1970’s. The name of the organization later
was changed to the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency (DARPA). DARPA now oversees
the DARPA Internet.

Is it a worm, virus, or trojan horse?

w
&
virus

trojan horse

A worm is a program that propagates itself from computer to
computer. Worms may be benign or malicious. A beneficial worm
might be a migration of computing workload to unused computers. An example of a malicious worm is the November 1988
DARPA Internet intrusion in which a program rapidly replicated
itself into many computers connected by a network.
A virus is a piece of code that can incorporate itself into other
programs. It is hidden into a program in the same way as a trojan
horse and can propagate in a similar manner to a worm.
A trojan horse is piece of code embedded in a program that
performs unwanted actions. A sample program might be a login program that not only performs the log-in function but also
makes unauthorized user name and password copies.

f io. 1 , Definitions.
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against maliciousness fit into this
scheme? In both of the examples
presented, it would have been easy
to make the attacks malicious (for
example deleting or modifying files)
thus causing great damage; nothing
in the system security prevented a
malicious attack, it was the worm
author’s decision not to be malicious.
The formal study of computer network security, for the most part, has
concentrated on preventing attacks
on the association model (Figure 3)
of computer to computer communication. The problem with virus and
worm attacks is that they do not follow the association model. The endpoints of the communication are no
longer secure. Thus virus and worm
attacks can pose a real threat.

Why do we want an internetwork?

searchers may submit programs to, and collect results from,
these supercomputers from their own local workstations without ever leaving their offices. The savings in travel time are

Fig. 2. lnternetworking applications

unexpected intrusions are not possible? To answer these questions, we
must examine the vehicle that allowed these attacks to occur, namely
the open computer internetwork.
An internetwork allows for the interconnection of various types of
physical networks, each with differing technologies, into a single functional coordinated unit. This means
that users can easily perform network applications (see Figure 2)
such as electronic mail and electronic bulletin boards. Researchers
may submit computations to specialized computers hundreds of miles
away and receive the results of their
computations at their local workstations. The internetworking software
forms an open systems interconnection in which systems of different architectures can cooperate to form a
single internetwork.
Members of an internetwork agree
to provide certain sewices to other
members of the internetwork. Members of the DARPA Internet use
a standardized agreement for information exchange called the Internet
Protocol or IP. The TCP (Transmission Control Protocol) utilizes the IP
to send and receive messages at well
known ports. A port is an address at
which a service resides. For exam30

ple, the ability to send and receive
electronic mail is maintained by a
specific port within the TCP. The
ability to transfer files is provided at
another port. All in all there are
several hundred ports reserved for
use by well-known services. On the
down side, each one of these ports is,
in principle, a point at which a system may be entered or compromised.
How does secure communication

Professional responsibility
As scientific and engineering professionals, we have a collective responsibility to police ourselves, much
as the medical community does. In
the past, violations of computing systems were seen as a “test of expertise,” and successful violators were
regarded with some awe by their
colleagues. This view must change.
After the DARPA Internet attack,
the governing boards of two major computer networks, BITNET and
CSNET, issued a joint statement on
issues of computer security. Of primary concern to them were statements made by many computing
professionals in response to the incident:
. . . (We) have been struck by the
fact that many public comments on
the event have contained statements
such as, “We learned from it, ” “We

Guarding flank by the book
The association model assumes that the attack will be made on a well-defined
communication path called an association between two services at their ports.
Attacks may be passive or active. A passive attack involves obtaining information
in an unauthorized way by “listening” to an association. Such information might
be system passwords, payroll data, social security numbers, and so forth. In an
active attack, an intruder might synthesize bogus messages and insert them into
the association, play back messages from a previous association at some later
time, or deny the receiving member all of its messages.
The primary tool for protection from attack is cryptography in which messages
are protected by secret codes known only to members of the association and
which are difficult for an intruder to obtain or guess. Encryption of a message
protects it from a passive attack. Protection from an active attack can be achieved
by requiring each member of the association to identify itself to each other member
of the association through a private encrypted digital signature. This ensures that
an intruder cannot forge the identity of a valid member of an association. Denial of
service may be guarded against by requiring both participants in the association
to exchange some predetermined secret information at the start and end of the
association. To prevent the playback of an old association, the current date and
time may be encrypted as part of the initial exchange to ensure the association is
current.
Fig. 3. The association model.
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will make sure technically that it
will not happen again,” or “He did
us a favor by showing . . .,” unaccompanied by expressions of ethical
concern. . .
They go on to make the following
comment:
We condemn the perpetration of
such “experiments, games, or features” by workers in our j?eM be
they students,faculty, researchersor
providers. We are especially worried about widespread tendencies to
justib, ignore, or perpetuate such
breaches. We must behave as do
our fellow scientists who have organized around comparable issues
to enforce strong ethical practices
in the conduct of experiments.
Clearly the point being made is
that computer networks are vital
economic systems whose disruption
could cause a significant nationwide
societal impact. The time when computer security violations were written
off as “pranks” has passed.
A debate exists as to whether,
when a security problem is found,
to keep the flaw a secret or publish
it. The former group sees publication
of existing security holes as a threat
that simply invites “exploration.” In
some respects, this is a valid viewpoint. If it were found that one could
break into a bank vault by simply
kicking it in at some obscure place,
mentioning this fact to the general
public would not be wise. On the
other hand, such a situation certainly
should be rectified. The latter group,
in the interest of removing the problem by engaging the resources of the
computing community to find a solution, is perhaps the most widely
held view. While, in view of the condemnation by the BITNETKSNET
boards, the first view might be appropriate, in reality, the second view
is more plausible. We simply must
assume that malicious intruders exist
and take actions to protect ourselves.
Protection
When you hook your computer to
a network, you are hooking up to
every computer that computer has
been with. . .
“Saturday Night Live, ” 1988
How can we protect systems from
unauthorized intrusion? The amount
of protection provided is in inverse
proportion to the ease of usability of
the system. Figure 4 illustrates some
options ranging from “safe” to “take
your chances.”
Achieving safe computing is diffiOCTOBER 1989

cult if your computer is connected to
an internetwork. The benefits of network interconnection, however, tend
to far outweigh the disadvantages.
This brings us back to the mice
problem, which finally did get resolved. Putting the snacks in glass
jars and letting the mice run innocuously around our feet was the ultimate solution (we could hardly put
our office in a glass jar). The moral?
Protect what you really want to keep
safe; the rest doesn’t really matter.
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Fig. 4. Some options for “safe computing.”
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